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Abstract
In this paper, we present an effective method to
craft text adversarial samples, revealing one impor-
tant yet underestimated fact that DNN-based text
classifiers are also prone to adversarial sample at-
tack. Specifically, confronted with different ad-
versarial scenarios, the text items that are impor-
tant for classification are identified by computing
the cost gradients of the input (white-box attack) or
generating a series of occluded test samples (black-
box attack). Based on these items, we design three
perturbation strategies, namely insertion, modifica-
tion, and removal, to generate adversarial samples.
The experiment results show that the adversarial
samples generated by our method can successfully
fool both state-of-the-art character-level and word-
level DNN-based text classifiers. The adversarial
samples can be perturbed to any desirable classes
without compromising their utilities. At the same
time, the introduced perturbation is difficult to be
perceived.
1 Introduction
To improve the robustness of deep neural networks (DNNs),
many recent studies [Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kereliuk et
al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini and Wagner,
2017] have focused on adversarial samples, which are well-
crafted to cause a trained model to misclassify. For example,
Goodfellow et al. [2015] showed that a panda image, added
with imperceptible perturbations, would be misclassified as
a gibbon by GoogLeNet [Szegedy et al., 2015]. However,
all existing studies in this field are targeted at DNNs for im-
age or audio classification; the DNNs for natural language
processing are seriously underestimated. In fact, text pro-
cessing plays an important role in modern information analy-
sis. For instance, many phishing webpage and spam detection
systems are primarily based on text classification [Whittaker
et al., 2010; Slawski, 2014]. A question arises naturally as
whether the text classification DNNs can also be attacked as
already done to image or audio classification DNNs.
Besides fooling the target DNN, we argue that an ef-
fective text adversarial sample should meet another two
requirements, imperceptible perturbations (i.e., the crafted
text can not draw human observers’ attention) and utility-
preserving. Utility-preserving means that the semantics of the
text should remain unchanged and human observers can cor-
rectly classify it without many efforts. Consider for instance a
spam message advertising something. Its adversarial version
should not only fool a spam filter, but also effectively deliver
the advertisement. However, satisfying these requirements is
highly nontrivial. In essence, text is a kind of discrete data,
while image or audio data is continuous. Continuous data is
tolerant of perturbations to some extent [Goodfellow et al.,
2015], while text is not. Even tiny perturbations will turn a
character or a word to a completely different one and a sen-
tence to be beyond recognition. As a result, when directly
adopting existing multimedia data targeted perturbation algo-
rithms to a text, the resulting text sample may lose its original
meaning or even become meaningless for human observers
(illustrated in Section 3.1).
In this paper, we present an effective method for crafting
adversarial samples against DNN-based text classifiers. In-
stead of simply overlapping the perturbation and the orig-
inal input, we design three perturbation strategies (i.e., in-
sertion, modification, and removal) and introduce the natural
language watermarking technique to elaborately dress up a
given text to generate an adversarial sample. In theory, craft-
ing an effective adversarial sample heavily depends on the
amount of knowledge about the target classification model.
We conduct either white-box or black-box attack to different
adversarial scenarios, to obtain desirable exploitable knowl-
edge. For the model whose implementation can be freely
and completely analyzed by the adversaries, the cost gradi-
ents of the input are computed to effectively determine what,
where and how to insert, modify or remove. Otherwise, if the
target model cannot be directly analyzed, we generate some
occluded test samples to probe it and obtain the above ex-
ploitable knowledge.
Without loss of generality, we pick two representative text
classification DNNs, i.e., a character-level model [Zhang et
al., 2015] and a word-level one [Kim, 2014], as attack tar-
gets. The attack experiments show that despite the concise-
ness, our method can perform effective source/target misclas-
sification attack against both DNNs and the adversarial sam-
ples generated by our three strategies satisfy all the require-
ments, i.e., fooling the target DNN, imperceptible perturba-
tions and utility-preserving. Our work effectively reveals that
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The Suzuki DR-Z400 is a dual purpose motorcycle manufactured by
Suzuki. Suzuki DR-Z400
(a) Original text sample.
bgaaeaTheaSuzukicDR-Z400aisaaadualepurposecmotorcyclecmanufac
turedabyaSuzuki.bSuzukiaDR-Z400
(b) Adversarial sample generated with FGSM directly.
The Suzuki DR-Z400 is afdual purboce matorcyclebmaaufacturea by
Suzuki. Suzuki DR-Z400
(c) Manipulating top characters (shown in red italic).
Figure 1: Adversarial text samples generated with FGSM.
DNN-based text classifiers are definitely vulnerable to the ad-
versarial sample attack.
2 Target Models and Datasets
Two representative DNN models and some corresponding
datasets are chosen as the experiment targets to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed method. One is a character-
level model [Zhang et al., 2015] and the other is word-level
[Kim, 2014]. The character-level DNN is trained on a DB-
pedia ontology dataset, which contains 560,000 training sam-
ples and 70,000 testing samples of 14 high-level classes, such
as Company, Building, Film and so on. Before feeding an in-
put text into the network, every character of the text is quan-
tized as a vector using one-hot representation. For example,
the character ‘c’ is encoded as the vector (0, 0, 1, 0, ..., 0), in
which only the third dimension is set to one. Through six con-
volutional layers and three fully-connected layers, the input
is finally projected into a vector indicating the classification
confidences of the 14 classes.
The word-level model consists of one convolutional layer,
followed by a max pooling layer and a fully connected layer
with dropout, and last a softmax output layer. Before be-
ing fed to the model, all the words within the input text
will be embedded to some 300-dimensional pre-trained vec-
tors [Mikolov et al., 2013]. The model is tested on several
datasets, including MR, CR and MPQA. The MR dataset is a
movie review repository (containing 10,662 reviews) while
CR contains 3,775 reviews about products, e.g. a music
player. Reviews from both datasets can be categorized as ei-
ther Positive or Negative. MPQA contains 10,606 opinions,
and each of them is labeled as Objective or Subjective.
3 White-box Attack
3.1 Overview
Goodfellow et al. [2015] first presented an effective gradient-
based method, called fast gradient sign method (FGSM for
short), to craft adversarial image samples. In the FGSM algo-
rithm, the introduced perturbation x is computed as the sign
of the model’s cost gradients, i.e., "sign(rxJ(F; x; c)),
where c is the true class of input x, J(F; x; c) is the cost func-
tion used to train the DNN F and " is set to be small enough
to make x undetectable. Simply overlapping x and x re-
gardless of gradients’ magnitude has been proven effective
Rank HTP Freq. Rank HTP Freq.
1 historic 7279 6 house 2447
2 building 4954 7 built 1927
3 church 3978 8 is a 1761
4 Register 3418 9 museum 1239
5 located 2604 10 is 1101
Table 1: Top ten HTPs of Building class.
to craft adversarial samples. Sometimes, only manipulating
the input pixels with large gradient magnitude can also do the
trick since a pixel with larger gradient magnitude often con-
tributes more to the current prediction, as illustrated in [Liang
et al., 2017].
We also leverage the cost gradient to craft adversarial sam-
ples, but in the text domain. However, the technique is not
directly applicable for text classification. As illustrated in
Figure 1(a), the original text is a short description of a mo-
torcycle and correctly classified as Means of Transportation
by the DNN model [Zhang et al., 2015]. Although the predic-
tion can be altered to Company by FGSM, the new text, see
Figure 1(b), is unreadable. One might consider manipulating
only a few characters with the highest gradient magnitude.
Still, the generated text is unnatural with noticeable pertur-
bations (see Figure 1(c)). It is clear that more sophisticated
strategies are needed to craft adversarial samples for the text
data. Specifically, in the white-box scenario, we first identify
text items that are important for classification according to
their cost gradients, and then leverage these items, along with
natural language watermarking technique, to decide what to
insert, modify or remove, where to insert and how to modify.
3.2 Identifying Classification-important Items
The foundation of our white-box attack lies in identifying the
text items that possess significant contribution to the classi-
fication by leveraging the cost gradient. Take the character-
level DNN for example. First, the backpropagation algorithm
is employed to compute the cost gradients rxJ(F; x; c) for
every training sample x. Consequently, we get the cost gradi-
ents of every dimension in all character vectors of these sam-
ples. Then we term characters containing the dimensions with
maximum highest magnitude hot characters. Per sample we
empirically select the top 50 hot characters. Subsequently,
hot words containing more than or equal to three hot charac-
ters can be identified through a simple scan and any adjacent
words will be assembled as a hot phrase if they are all hot
words. Hot words that are not assembled will be treated as hot
phrases, too. Finally, for all training samples, the hot phrases
obtained previously will be collected together according to
samples’ labels. From them, we determine the most frequent
phrases, called Hot Training Phrases (HTPs). Take the Build-
ing class for example, its top ten HTPs are illustrated in Table
1. HTPs for the word-level DNN can be obtained in a simi-
lar way, only this time hot phrases are directly identified by
looking for the word vectors possessing the maximum highest
gradient magnitudes.
HTPs shed light on what to insert, but where to insert,
remove and modify remains unclear. Fortunately, obtaining
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The Uganda Securities Exchange (USE) is the historic principal stock
exchange of Uganda. It was founded in June 1997. The USE is operated
under the jurisdiction of Uganda’s Capital Markets Authority which in
turn reports to the Bank of Uganda, Uganda’s central bank. The ex-
change’s doors opened to trading in January 1998. At the time, the
exchange had just one listing, a bond issued by the East African Devel-
opment Bank. Uganda Securities Exchange
Figure 2: An adversarial text sample generated by inserting just one
HTP (99.7% Company to 88.6% Building).
such information is similar to identifying HTPs. Given a text
sample, we still employ the backpropagation algorithm to lo-
cate hot phrases with significant contribution to the current
classification, and those phrases are recognized as Hot Sam-
ple Phrases (HSPs). HSPs imply where to manipulate to craft
an effectual adversarial sample.
3.3 Attacking Character-level DNN
Based on HTPs and HSPs , three perturbation strategies, i.e.,
insertion, modification and removal, are used alone or in com-
bination to craft an adversarial sample for a given text. It is
worth pointing out that the proposed method allows us to ar-
bitrarily choose a class of interest as the target class to launch
a source/target misclassification attack rather than just alter-
ing the output classification to any class different from the
original, as presented in [Goodfellow et al., 2015].
Insertion Strategy
For a given text t, if F (t) = c, the goal of the strategy is to
insert some new text items (attack payload) in t, which can
effectually upgrade the classification confidence of t for the
class c0 of interest (c0 6= c) and hopefully downgrade the con-
fidence of the original class c accordingly. HTPs are used as
the key elements to construct our attack payload. As Figure 2
shows, inserting just one HTP (“historic”) just before the HSP
(“principal stock exchange of Uganda. It was founded”) can
successfully let a text describing a company be misclassified
as the Building class with 88.6% confidence.
In practice, multiple insertions are often needed. However,
directly inserting multiple HTPs into a text is likely to hurt
its utility and readability. To address the problem as well as
enrich the means of attacking, we introduce the NL (Natu-
ral Language) watermarking technique. The technique can
stealthily embed an ownership watermark into a plain text via
manipulating it semantically or syntactically, such as replac-
ing words with their synonyms or typos [Topkara et al., 2006;
2007], paraphrasing representation [Barzilay and McKeown,
2001], adding presuppositions [Vybornova and Macq, 2007],
and inserting semantically empty phrases [Atallah et al.,
2001]. Though the goal of our attack is essentially differ-
ent from that of NL watermarking, we can borrow its idea to
craft adversarial samples. In fact, the perturbation can be re-
garded as a kind of watermark and embedded into the sample
in similar ways.
Here, we extend the ideas of inserting presuppositions [Vy-
bornova and Macq, 2007] and semantically empty phrases
[Atallah et al., 2001] to perturb the target text sample. Pre-
supposition is an implicit information that can be considered
well-known to the readers, and a semantically empty phrase
is a dispensable component. With or without them, the text’s
Hot Issue is the second Korean EP by South Korean boy band Big Bang,
released under YG Entertainment , an entertainment company founded
in 1996 in Seoul, South Korea. Big Bang’s first EP Always further
established the group’s popularity in South Korea, with the single Last
Farewell topping online charts for 8 consecutive weeks, sold over 5
million digital downloads. The group’s leader, the then 20-year-old G-
Dragon produced and wrote the lyrics for all tracks on Hot Issue. The
song is a blend of trance hip-hop beats and pop melodies. Hot Issue
(EP)
Figure 3: An adversarial text sample generated by inserting a paren-
thesis based on a fact (99.9% Album to 94.0% Company).
The APM 20 Lionceau is a two-seat very light aircraft manufactured
by the French manufacturer Issoire Aviation. Despite its classic ap-
pearance it is entirely built from composite materials especially carbon
fibers. Designed by Philippe Moniot and certified in 1999 (see EASA
CS-VLA) this very light (400 kg empty 634 kg loaded) and economical
(80 PS engine) aircraft is primarily intended to be used to learn to fly but
also to travel with a relatively high cruise speed (113 knots). Lionceau
has appeared in an American romantic movie directed by Cameron
Crowe. A three-seat version the APM 30 Lion was present-ed at the
2005 Paris Air Show. Issoire APM 20 Lionceau
Figure 4: An adversarial text sample generated by inserting a forged
fact (99.9% Means of Transportation to 90.2% Film).
meaning remains unchanged. In general, we consider to in-
troduce multiple HTPs by assembling them into a syntax unit
and inserting it in a proper position. The new unit can be
crafted as a dispensable fact (see Figure 3) or even a forged
fact (see Figure 4) that does not hurt the text’s primary se-
mantics.
Specifically, by searching Internet or some databases of
facts, e.g., [Suchanek et al., 2007], we can get some facts
that are closely related to the insertion point and embody
some desirable HTPs of the target class as well. For exam-
ple, as shown in Figure 3, we google the company name “YG
Entertainment” along with some combinations of HTPs and
a related fact that carries three HTPs of the Company class
(“company”, “founded” and “entertainment”) can be easily
found from Wikipedia. Inserting it after the company name
can craft an effectual adversarial sample, without drawing hu-
man observer’s attention. When a proper fact is not available,
we present a new concept, called forged fact, to wrap desir-
able HTPs. The forged fact can be created by reforming some
real things related to the HTPs to make people believe it really
happened. Furthermore, we exclude forged facts that can be
disproved by retrieving their opposing evidences on Internet.
Figure 4 presents a forged fact carrying desirable HTPs (“ro-
mantic”, “movie”, “directed by” and “American”) that fools
the target DNN.
Modification Strategy
The modification strategy is to affect the model output by
slightly manipulating some HSPs in the input. In theory, the
modification should increase the cost function J(F; t; c)
and meanwhile decrease J(F; t; c0). In other words, the
modification should follow the direction of the cost gradient
J(F; t; c), yet against the direction of J(F; t; c0).
In order to perform the modification without getting human
observer’s attention, we adopt the typo-based watermarking
technique [Topkara et al., 2007]. Specifically, an HSP is
modified in two ways: (1) replaced with its common mis-
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Maisie is a comedy flim property MGM originally purchased for Jean
Harlow but before a shooting script could be completed Harlow died in
1937. It was put on hold until 1939 when Ann Sothern was hired to
star in the project with Robert Young as leading man. It is based on
the novel Dark Dame by Wilson Collison. It was the first of ten films
starring Sothern as Maisie Ravier. In Mary C. Maisie (film)
Figure 5: An adversarial text sample generated by introducing a
common misspelling (99.6% Film to 99.0% Company).
Modification
“film”! “flim”
Cost Gradient
Source Class
(Film)
Target Class
(Company)
‘i’! ‘l’:(..., 1, ..., 0, ...)
! (..., 0, ..., 1, ...)
1! 0 # -0.01913 # 4.61543 "
0! 1 " 0.00707 " -1.71717 #
‘l’! ‘i’:(..., 0, ..., 1, ...)
! (..., 1, ..., 0, ...)
0! 1 " 0.01457 " -3.50519 #
1! 0 # -0.03177 # 7.62243 "
Table 2: The Direction of the Cost Gradients.
spellings, and (2) some characters of it be changed to ones
in similar visual appearance, e.g., the lower-case letter ‘l’ (el)
be replaced with the digit ‘1’ (one). As shown in Figure 5,
typo-based modifications can cause dramatic prediction er-
rors. The phrase “comedy film property” is an HSP of the
original class (Film) and the typo “flim” is obtained from
a misspelling corpus [Mitton, 1985]. Furthermore, as illus-
trated in Table 2, replacing “film” with “flim” does follow the
desirable gradient directions.
Removal Strategy
The removal strategy alone may not be effective enough to al-
ter the prediction, but can largely downgrade the confidence
of the original class. Since arbitrarily eliminating HSPs from
the input often compromises its meaning, only words of the
HSPs that play as a supplementary role, e.g., an inessential
adjective or adverb, can be removed. As Figure 6 shows, re-
moving “British” (part of the HSP “seven-part British televi-
sion series”) can result in a confidence decline of 35.0%.
Combination of Three Strategies
As illustrated in Figure 6, changing the output classification
by the removal strategy alone is often difficult. However,
by combining it with the other strategies, excessive modifi-
cations or insertions to the original text can be avoided. In
practice, we often combine the above three strategies to craft
subtle adversarial samples. Take Figure 7 for example, by
removing an HSP, inserting a forged fact and modifying an
HSP, the output classification can be successfully changed,
but applying any above perturbation alone fails. Specifically,
the removal, insertion and modification only downgrade the
confidence by 27.3%, 17.5% and 10.1% respectively, keeping
the prediction class unchanged.
3.4 Attacking Word-level DNN
Attacking the word-level DNN is similar to attacking the
character-level one. As shown in Figure 8, leveraging the
obtained HTPs and HSPs, the three perturbation strategies
are proven to be effective. Figure 8(a) presents a positive
Edward & Mrs. Simpson is a seven-part British television series that
dramatises the events leading to the 1936 abdication of King Edward
VIII of the United Kingdom who gave up his throne to marry the twice-
divorced American Wallis Simpson. The series made by Thames Tele-
vision for ITV was originally broadcast in 1978. Edward Fox played
Edward and Cynthia Harris portrayed Mrs. Simpson. Edward & Mrs.
Simpson
Figure 6: Lower the confidence of the original class by removing a
word from an HSP (95.5% Film to 60.5% Film).
The Old Harbor Reservation Parkways are three historic roads in the
Old Harbor area of Boston. Some exhibitions of Navy aircrafts were
held here. They are part of the Boston parkway system designed by
Frederick Law Olmsted. They include all of William J. Day Boulevard
running from Cast1e Island to Kosciuszko Circle along Pleasure Bay
and the Old Harbor shore. The part of Columbia Road from its north-
eastern end at Farragut Road west to Pacuska Circle (formerly called
Preble Circle). Old Harbor Reservation
Figure 7: Combination of three strategies (83.7% Building to 95.7%
Means of Transportation).
movie review from MR dataset. Inserting one HTP “boring”
from the Negative class successfully alters the prediction. As
demonstrated in Figure 3 and 4, single insertion may not al-
ways be sufficient to craft an adversarial sample, and in such
cases, a proper parenthesis that wraps several desired HTPs
is needed. In Figure 8(b), we compose a clause with two Pos-
itive HTPs, i.e., “awesome” and “amazing”, and insert it into
a negative review of a music player (from CR). The resul-
tant text is misclassified as Positive with 87.3% confidence.
Sometimes, the modification strategy can also be performed
by paraphrasing representations, as done in NL watermark-
ing [Barzilay and McKeown, 2001]. Taking Figure 8(c) for
example, by simply paraphrasing the phrase “different from”
to “not” (a Negative HTP), we make a positive customer re-
view be misclassified as Negative. As for the removal strat-
egy, a sample (Figure 8(d)) from MPQA dataset shows that
its adversarial sample can be crafted by simply removing a
phrase which contains an Objective HSP “promotion”.
4 Black-box Attack
In the black-box scenario, internal knowledge of the target
model (e.g., cost gradients) is no longer available. In such
cases, we borrow the idea of the fuzzing technique [Sutton
et al., 2007] to implement a blind test to locate HTPs and
HSPs. By sophisticatedly generating a number of malformed
inputs, fuzzing can trigger unexpected system behaviors (e.g.,
a system crash) to find potential security bugs, even without
knowing the detailed knowledge about the target system.
Similarly, in our proposed method, some test samples are
purposefully generated to probe the target model. Since in
the black-box scenario, we don’t know the technique details
about the model, including the input preprocessing, the test
sample generation policy should remain the same no matter
the model is character-level or word-level. In practice, we
employ one straightforward generation policy to avoid pro-
ducing too many test samples and being blocked in certain
cases. As shown in Figure 9, to generate test samples for a
given seed sample, we occlude its words one by one with a
sequence of whitespaces, whose length is exactly the same
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spider-man is better than any summer blockbuster we had to endure last
boring summer , and hopefully , sets the tone for a summer of good
stuff . if you’re a comic fan , you can’t miss it . if you’re not , you’ll
still have a good time .
(a) Inserting one HTP (97.8% Positive to 90.2% Negative).
no in box accessories – an arm strap , belt strap , case , or anything
would be nice , but nope . . . moveable parts – this makes me almost
want to keep my 3rd gen over a 4th ; . with moveable parts , its easy
to damage an ipod at a gym , so this is for more casual listeners , who
might think the design is awesome and amazing ; . note the ipod mini
doesn ’t have moveable parts and is made of titanium .
(b) Inserting multiple HTPs (99.7% Negative to 87.3% Positive).
the battery life last es 12 hours , and charges quickly . ( as mentioned
above , the initial charge is a minimum of only two hours - not too long
at all ! . ) once you ’ve downloaded your music , you can access the
tracks by artist , genre , album , composer ( this comes in handy when
the actual composer is different from not the artist - e . g . covers of
songs ) , etc .
(c) Paraphrasing a phrase (83.9% Positive to 92.0% Negative).
promotion of world security , improvement of economic conditions ,
defusing regional and global crises and conflicts , checking unleashed
competition for rearmament , reduction of the gap between the main-
stream and peripheral countries
(d) Removing a phrase (87.8% Objective to 69.3% Subjective).
Figure 8: Attacking the word-level DNN.
No. Samples Conf.
seed Edward & Mrs. Simpson is a seven-part ... 95.5%
1 tttttt & Mrs. Simpson is a seven-part ... 98.2%
2 Edward t Mrs. Simpson is a seven-part ... 97.8%
... ... ...
8 ... seven-part ttttttt television series ... 68.6%
9 ... seven-part British tttttttttt series ... 53.3%
... ... ...
70 ... Mrs. Simpson. Edward & Mrs. ttttttt 97.8%
Table 3: The test samples generated from a seed.
as the occluded word. Choosing whitespaces for occlusion is
because in many natural languages, e.g. English, redundant
whitespaces often contribute nearly nothing to the semantics
of the texts, and the “same length” restriction is to preserve
the structural integrity of the whole text as far as possible. In
some DNN-based text classifiers, e.g., [Zhang et al., 2015],
the classification of a text is impressionable to its structure.
Hence, using only one whitespace for occlusion or directly
removing a word may cause unwanted problems. We feed all
the test samples to the target model and record their classi-
fication results. By comparing the classification result of a
test sample with the seed, we can learn how much deviation
an occluded word can cause. The larger the deviation is, the
more importance the corresponding word attaches to the cor-
rect classification. The words that can bring largest deviations
are identified as HSPs for the seed sample.
Taking the 70-word text in Figure 6 as a seed, 70 test sam-
ples can be generated with the proposed scheme, as Table 3
shows. After feeding them to the target model [Zhang et al.,
 
… 
Seed sample 
Test samples Classifier 
Classification results 
Hot phrases 
Figure 9: Identifying hot phrases with the black-box test.
Rank Positive Review Negative ReviewWhite-box Black-box White-box Black-box
1 great great not not
2 easy easy problem ’t
3 good good no problem
4 excellent excellent problems little
5 best and slow no
6 nice best too bit
7 not love annoying annoying
8 love nice flaw flaw
9 awesome no useless problems
10 pleased well little slow
Table 4: Top ten HTPs of CR dataset.
2015], we find that occluding “television” and “British” can
cause the largest confidence declines (dropping by 42.2% and
26.9% respectively), and the two words can be identified as
the HSPs of the text. By using them, we develop the same per-
turbation as illustrated in Figure 6, i.e., removing “British”.
HTPs can be identified in a similar way. In our experiments,
we apply the occlusion scheme to the training sets and only
select one hot word (the word that being occluded can cause
the largest deviation) from each sample. All the hot words are
collected according to the samples’ labels, and the most fre-
quent ones are recognized as HTPs. The experiment results
show that the black-box testing can achieve similar perfor-
mance in identifying HTPs with the white-box way. Table 4
presents the top ten HTPs for the two classes of CR dataset,
which are found by white-box and black-box method respec-
tively. We can see that seven out of top ten HTPs are the
same (shown in gray background) for Positive class and eight
for Negative.
In fact, all the HTPs and HSPs used to craft the adversarial
samples from Figures 2  8 can be identified through black-
box testing. The same perturbation strategies (i.e. insertion,
modification and removal) can be adopted to generate the pre-
sented adversarial samples. We believe that black-box attack
is as effective as the white-box one.
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No. SourceClass No.
Target
Class No.
Inserted
HTPs
Modified
HSPs
Removed
HSPs
1
6#(99.9%)
1#(94.4%) 3 0 0
2 2#(76.3%) 5 0 1
3 3#(68.2%) 5 3 1
4 4#(84.7%) 3 3 1
5 5#(82.4%) 4 0 1
6 7#(86.3%) 3 2 1
7 8#(70.0%) 2 3 1
8 9#(89.7%) 3 2 1
9 10#(81.0%) 3 2 1
10 11#(82.4%) 3 0 0
11 12#(66.3%) 3 2 1
12 13#(82.4%) 4 0 0
13 14#(80.2%) 4 2 1
14 1#(99.7%) 7#(88.6%) 1 0 0
15 2#(99.3%) 13#(72.0%) 2 1 0
16 3#(99.8%) 12#(84.2%) 2 1 0
17 4#(99.9%) 3#(77.5%) 2 1 1
18 5#(99.8%) 4#(95.9%) 3 1 0
19 7#(83.7%) 6#(88.7%) 2 1 1
20 8#(99.5%) 7#(96.3%) 1 0 0
21 9#(99.9%) 7#(98.2%) 1 1 0
22 10#(84.6%) 6#(94.2%) 0 0 1
23 11#(85.3%) 8#(81.7%) 1 0 1
24 12#(99.9%) 1#(94.0%) 2 0 0
25 13#(99.6%) 1#(99.0%) 0 1 0
26 14#(99.9%)13#(87.1%) 3 0 1
Avg. 98.1% 84.7% 2.5 1.0 0.6
Table 5: Experiments for Q1 and Q2.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our method by answering the
following questions.
Q1: Can our method perform effective source/target mis-
classification attack? Among the test sets, the DBpedia on-
tology dataset is the only multi-class set. We randomly se-
lect a sample from it, originally classified as Means of Trans-
portation (class 6#), and manage to perturb the sample to the
other 13 classes using the three strategies (see Table 5, No.
113). In addition, we randomly select one sample from each
of the 13 classes (except Means of Transportation) and man-
age to craft desirable adversarial samples as well (see Table
5, No. 1426). Those experiments indicate that our method
can perform effective source/target misclassification attack.
Q2: Can the adversarial samples avoid being distin-
guished by human observers and still keep the utility? We
perform a single-blind user study with 23 students from our
university as subjects. They have no prior knowledge about
this project and each of them is provided with 20 text sam-
ples, half of which are with perturbations. The subjects don’t
know which samples are affected. They are asked to manu-
ally classify each sample. Further, if they consider a sample
is artificially modified, they are asked to pinpoint where the
modification is performed.
For the ten original samples, the subjects classify them
with an averaged accuracy of 94.2%, while for the ten af-
fected samples the accuracy is 94.8%. The comparable per-
formance shows that the utility is indeed preserved in the ad-
versarial samples. In total, there are 240 places marked as
modified, with 12 successful matches. Recall that our method
yields 594 changes. Our modifications can be detected by
the human observers with an accuracy of 12/240=5.0% and
a recall of 12/594=2.0%. The result suggests that the crafted
adversarial samples are difficult to be perceived.
Q3: Is our method efficient enough? The white-box at-
tack took 116 hours in total to compute the cost gradient and
identify HTPs for all the 14 classes of the DBpedia dataset
(8.29 hours per class) on a desktop computer. For the black-
box attack, generating test samples and identifying the HTPs
cost 107 hours (7.63 hours per class). For the other relatively
small datasets (i.e., MR, CR and MPQA), we can get their
HTPs within several minutes. Crafting one adversarial sam-
ple takes about 15 minutes. In practice, attackers are willing
to spend more time to craft a desirable adversarial sample.
Q4: White-box and black-box, which is more powerful?
Our experiments show that HTPs obtained in the two ways
are highly overlapped, about 80% of which are the same, and
for a given sample, the obtained HSPs are often the same.
Furthermore, in practice, the white-box analysis may identify
some hot phrases that are missed in the black-box test, and
vice versa. For example, two exploitable Negative HTPs “dis-
appointed” and “terrible” from the CR dataset are recognized
in the white-box way, which are missed in the black-box way.
At the same time, two exploitable Positive HTPs “beautiful”
and “charming” from the MR dataset can only be hit in the
black-box test. The four words can all be leveraged to per-
form successful evasion attacks. These evidences imply that
both ways are effective and complementary to each other.
6 Related Work
Many studies have being focused on crafting adversarial sam-
ples to bypass DNN-based classifiers, and various gener-
ation techniques have been proposed, including gradient-
based [Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kereliuk et al., 2015], deci-
sion function-based [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016] and evo-
lution-based [Nguyen et al., 2015] approaches. The gradient-
based method is most efficient and easy to use. Papernot et
al. [2016] introduced a defense named defensive distillation
to adversarial samples. Two networks were trained as a dis-
tillation, where the first network produced probability vec-
tors used to label the original dataset, while the other was
trained using the newly labeled dataset. As a result, the effec-
tiveness of adversarial samples can be substantially reduced.
However, as pointed in [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], how to
construct defenses that are robust to adversarial examples re-
mains open. A feasible solution is to improve the robustness
of DNNs by making it harder for attackers to craft adversarial
samples rather than eliminating them thoroughly. The adver-
sarial training is a straightforward defense technique which
uses as many as possible adversarial samples during the train-
ing process as a kind of regularization [Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Kereliuk et al., 2015]. This can make it harder for
attackers to generate new adversarial samples. All of these
studies are targeted at image DNN-based classifiers. Text as
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discrete data is sensitive to perturbation and the above meth-
ods are not directly applicable for text.
Recently, a few researchers began to pay close attention to
adversarial samples for text data. Jia and Liang [2017] cre-
ated adversarial examples for sixteen reading comprehension
systems by appending distracting sentences to a given para-
graph. The resulting paragraph can cause the target system
to output a wrong answer. However, the appended sentence
tends to be incompatible with the whole target paragraph.
Gong et al. [2018] adopted image targeted perturbation al-
gorithms (e.g., FGSM) to disturb the word embedding space
of given text samples and reconstructed the space via nearest
neighbor search. In this way, the generated text can be free
from gibberish words. However, according to the authors,
their method depends heavily on the size and quality of the
embedding space. Besides, from some presented adversarial
texts, we can see there are a considerable number of perturba-
tions that make the text unnatural. Gao et al. [2018] proposed
a black-box attack algorithm to generate small perturbations.
In general, the algorithm first determines the important to-
kens according to the scoring functions they defined, and then
applies some character-level transformations (i.e. swap, sub-
stitution, deletion and insertion) to the identified tokens. Al-
though this kind of character-level attack strategy adopted by
this algorithm can successfully generate certain adversarial
samples, the introduced perturbations are limited to typos. In
practice, introducing excessive typos will heavily harm the
utlity of the samples.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we’ve revealed one important yet underes-
timated fact that DNN-based text classification is surpris-
ingly vulnerable to adversarial sample attack, so its robust-
ness should be seriously considered. Specifically, we con-
duct either white-box or black-box attack to different adver-
sarial scenarios and craft effectual text adversarial samples in
both ways. Still, our work can be further refined. Arras et
al. [2016] leverage a technique called layer-wise relevance
propagation (LRP) to locate words that have positive impact
as well as words that may bring negative impact for a spe-
cific predication of a DNN. We believe such technique can
also be adopted for identifying HTPs and HSPs in white-box
attack. Our black-box attack assumes access to training set
and demands confidence degree for feedback, however, such
resources may not always be available. Some studies have
demonstrated that adversarial samples can transfer from one
model to another, even if the second model has a different
architecture or was trained on a different set [Szegedy et al.,
2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015], which implies that our black-
box attack may can be conducted in an indirect way, e.g.,
training and fooling a substitute model.
So far, our method requires some human efforts when craft-
ing an adversarial sample. Such amounts of human efforts
are acceptable for common attack scenarios. To support ad-
versarial training and investigate the possibility of large-scale
attacks, in the future, we will address how to automatically
craft adversarial text samples.
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